We analyze a mean field tournament: a mean field game in which the agents receive rewards according to the ranking of the terminal value of their projects and are subject to cost of effort. Using Schrödinger bridges we are able to explicitly calculate the equilibrium. This allows us to identify the reward functions which would yield a desired equilibrium and solve several related mechanism design problems. We are also able to identify the effect of reward inequality on the players' welfare as well as calculate the price of anarchy.
Introduction
Consider the following tournament: each player (indexed by i ∈ {1, . . . , N }) exerts an effort, which we denote by a i , to move the value of her project/state, which is modeled as a drifted Brownian motion:
We assume B 1 , . . . , B N are independent. The cost of effort per unit time is assumed to be quadratic in a i with coefficient c. The game ends at time T > 0, when each player receives a reward that is a deterministic function of three components:
• Her terminal project value X i,T ; • The ranking of X i,T relative to other players, measured by the fraction 1 N N j=1 1 {X j,T ≤X i,T } of players having equal or worse performance (so that the top performer has rank one and the bottom performer has rank 1/N );
• Statistics of the population performance, such as population mean 1 N N j=1 X j,T or the k-th order statistic of X 1,T , . . . , X N,T or both. This allows us to cover the case when the "reward pie" is not fixed, but grows with the total production or the k-th best performance. For simplicity of the presentation, we only consider dependence via the population mean.
In this paper, we will analyze the mean field game associated with the above N -player game, and explicitly characterize the equilibrium (see Section 3), improving on the results of [2] which dealt only with the abstract existence and uniqueness of the mean-field equilibrium. Analysis of mean-field games is useful in solving N -player games when N is large, since it has been shown in [2] that the mean-field equilibrium can be used to construct an approximate Nash equilibria for the finite player games.
Our explicit characterization, which is a rare feat in mean field games, allows us to solve tournament design problems. Specifically, we determine in Section 5 the reward functions that maximize the rank-α performance, the net profit (for the tournament planner), and the total effort, respectively. Moreover, in Section 6, we also compute the so-called price of anarchy which measures the efficiency loss due to decentralization; see e.g. [13] , [5] , and [3] .
Mean field games, introduced simultaneously by Lasry and Lions [14, 15, 16] , and Huang Caines and Malhamé [12, 11] (see also the the volume book of Delarue and Carmona [4] for an extensive overview), analyzes games with a large number of players which are weakly interacting through their empirical distribution. The main appeal of the mean field games is the decentralized structure of their equilibria: agents compute their best response to a given population distribution, which is then determined by a fixed point problem. The best response calculation is a pure stochastic control problem. Instead of working with the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, we perform the calculation using Schrödinger bridges which can be seen as the stochastic analogue of quadratic optimal transport. (See [18, 7] for an overview of Schrödinger bridges and their connection to optimal transport.) We first introduce an auxiliary terminal distribution for the state (to convert the problem to an optimal transport problem), and then optimize over all such terminal distributions. This approach allows us to reformulate the best response problem as a static calculus of variation problem, which we then explicitly solve. This leads us to the next stage, the fixed point equation, whose solutions can be explicitly determined through its quantiles.
The distinguishing feature of our mean field game, i.e., tournaments, is the rank-based feature of the reward. In particular, each player is rewarded according to the ranking of the terminal value of their project relative to the population, subject to cost of effort. This makes the analysis of the problem more difficult since the mean field interaction is non-local in the measure and rank function is not regular. This problem was suggested by [10] as a model in oil production, analyzed using abstract tools in the weak formulation by [6] and in the strong formulation by [2] . In these works continuity with respect to the rank was assumed. Related tournament games where the players are ranked according to their completion times has been considered by [1] for controlled Brownian motion dynamics and by [21] for one-stage Poisson dynamics with controlled jump intensity. In the Appendix we are going to construct an extension of Schrödinger bridges from space to time which can then be applied to construct the equilibrium in [1] as well.
In economics there is a substantial literature on tournaments, going back to [17] ; see [1] for a review. Most of these works focus on finitely many players or static models. Using such a one shot model, [8] analyze the discouraging effects of inequality. In our paper we observe a similar phenomenon, in that the more unequal the reward is (in the Lorenz order, see e.g. [20] ) the smaller the game value for each player. However, unlike the in the work of [8] , the same is not true for the effort in our set-up: the most fair distribution induces agents to put forth zero effort. Hence, one of the questions in the mechanism design section we investigate is what reward function maximizes the cumulative effort. We also analyze the case when agents have a social planner doing the optimization, which is used in computing the price of anarchy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we consider the single player's problem and find her best response using Schrödinger bridges. We then explicitly compute the mean field equilibrium in Section 3 and show the effect of reward inequality on the well-being of the players in Section 4. Section 5 is where we investigate the tournament design problems with respect to several criteria. In Section 6 we compute the price of anarchy. Finally, in Section A we show how one can adapt the Schrödinger bridge approach to the completion time ranking game of [1] .
A single player's problem
Let us first describe the incentives of the player: We call R(x, r, m) : R × [0, 1] × R → R ∪ {±∞} a reward function if it is increasing in all of its arguments 1 , R-valued if r ∈ (0, 1), and satisfies 1 0 R(x, r, m)dr < ∞ for all (x, m) ∈ R 2 . Denote the set of reward functions by R and the set of bounded reward functions by R b .
Given the distributionμ ∈ P(R) of the terminal project value of the population, we wish to find the best response toμ for a representative player. For any µ ∈ P(R), write F µ for the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of µ and R µ (x) for R(x, F µ (x), R ydµ(y)). A representative player with cost parameter c solves the following stochastic control problem:
where
Here a is admissible if it is progressively measurable and satisfies E T 0 |a s |ds < ∞. Different from [2] , let us consider the weak formulation of the above problem, which has some interesting connection with optimal transport.
Let Ω = C([0, T ], R) be the Wiener space and W x be the Wiener measure starting at x at t = 0. Under W 0 , the canonical process ω t is a Brownian motion, and thus X t := x 0 + σω t represents the project value process under zero effort. Let P be the law of X under W 0 , and (F t ) t∈[0,T ] be the filtration generated by the process ω t .
For any Q ∈ P(Ω) such that Q ∼ P , the Girsanov theorem implies that we can find an adapted process a t such that dX t = a t dt + σdB Q t for some Q-Brownian motion B Q . Conversely, given any sufficiently integrable adapted process a t , we can define Q ∼ P such that the above equation holds. This means that if we restrict ourselves to sufficiently integrable effort process, we can identify Q := {Q ∈ P(Ω) : Q ∼ P } with the set of laws of the controlled project value process X. Moreover, let H(·|·) denote the relative entropy, with the convention that H(Q|P ) = ∞ if Q is not absolutely continuous with respect to P . We have
Thus, we take the following as our definition of the single player's control problem:
Remark 2.1. Here to keep notation simple, we define the filtration to be the one generated by the canonical process, but similar to [1, Remark 2.1], all results remain valid if we take (F t ) to be a larger filtration for which ω t remains a Brownian motion.
Reduction via Schrödinger bridges
Let X t = x 0 + σω t and P = W 0 • X −1 as before; P will serve as our reference measure. 2 For any Q ∈ P(Ω), write Q t for the time-t marginal of Q, and Q 0,T for the joint distribution of Q at time 0 and T . Given a source distribution ν = δ x 0 and a target distribution µ, the Schrödinger bridge problem looks for an entropy-minimizing transport from ν to µ:
It is known, by a simple disintegration, that the solution to the Schrödinger bridge problem is given by (see [9] , and also [18] , [7] )
where P x,y := P (·|X 0 = x, X T = y) is the law of a scaled Brownian bridge (scaled by σ), and π * is the solution to the following static optimization, assuming it exists:
In addition, it holds that H(Q * |P ) = H(π * |P 0,T ). Since ν = P 0 = δ x 0 , the static problem (2.5) is trivial, giving a minimum entropy of H(µ|N (x 0 , σ 2 T )).
Going back to our control problem (2.3), by splitting the optimization over Q to a maximization over its time-T marginal plus a constrained entropy minimization, we can utilize the equivalence between (2.4) and (2.5) and obtain
Since Q(·) = R 2 P x 0 ,y (·)µ(dy) ∈ Q for any µ ∼ P T , the inequality is in fact an equality. Thus,
Let ϕ be the standard normal p.d.f. and introduce
We finally arrive at a constrained calculus of variation problem over the p.d.f. of µ:
which can be easily solved by the method of Lagrange multiplier. 3 The solution is provided below without proof. Once we find the optimal marginal µ * , we can recover Q * by Q * (·) =
where f 0 is defined in (2.7). Suppose β(μ) < ∞. Then the optimal terminal distribution µ * of the single player has p.d.f.
The optimal value is given by V (R,μ) = 2cσ 2 ln β(μ).
Remark 2.2. The Schrödinger bridge approach can also be adapted to the hitting time ranking game of [1] . This calls for a variant of the Schrödinger bridge problem where the target distribution is not the time-T marginal, but the law of first passage time of level zero. We detail this digression in the appendix for the interested readers.
Optimal effort
The Schrödinger bridge approach allows us to compute the optimal target distribution easily, which is all we need to analyze equilibrium measures (see Section 3 for details). On the other hand, to get a more explicit description of the optimal effort, ideally as a feedback function a * (t, x) of time and state, we still need to go back to the dynamic control formulation of the Schrödinger bridge problem. We can utilize some existing results in, for example, [7] .
Recall that under the reference measure P , the canonical process is a scaled Brownian motion with transition density
Note that f 0 (y) = p(0, x 0 , T, y). Define
It can be easily checked that ψ,ψ satisfy
By [7, p. 679-680] , the optimal coupling Q * has Markovian drift a * given by
Using (2.8), we obtain
Comparing with [2, eq. (3.
3)], we see that u(t, x) := β(μ)ψ(t, x) is precisely the Cole-Hopf transformation of the value function of the original control problem (2.1). Replacing ψ by u, we recover the same optimal Markovian control as [2] :
When R is bounded, it is shown in [2] that lim x→±∞ a * (t, x) = 0, meaning players show slackness when having a very big lead, and give up when falling far behind.
Remark 2.3. For bounded rewards, [2] also showed that the controlled diffusion dX t = a * (t, X t )dt+ σdB t in fact has a unique strong solution. From there, one can mimic the change of measure technique in [1] to obtain the optimal terminal distribution (2.8). An advantage of the weak formulation, beside the connection to optimal transport theory, is that it avoids the hassle of having to verify the regularity of a * near x = 0.
Characterization of equilibrium
We say µ ∈ P(R) is an equilibrium (terminal distribution) if it is a fixed point of the best response mapping:μ → Q T : Q = arg max Q∈Q V (R,μ). By (2.8), we have the following characterization for general rewards functions.
Theorem 3.1. Let R ∈ R and µ ∈ P(R) satisfy
(The above condition always hold when R ∈ R b .) Then µ is an equilibrium if and only if it has a strictly positive density satisfying
The associated game value is given by V (R, µ) = 2cσ 2 ln β(µ).
4 [7] assumes σ = 1, but the proof can be easily generalized to nonzero σ.
Specializing to the subclass of reward functions
is independent of x and continuous in m},
we obtain a semi-explicit characterization.
Theorem 3.2. Suppose R ∈ R rm b . Then there exists at least one equilibrium. µ ∈ P(R) is an equilibrium terminal distribution of the project value if and only if its quantile function q µ satisfies 
The associated game value is given by
Proof. Since R is bounded, we only need to look for solutions of the fixed point equation (3.1). Let
Since any fixed point µ has a positive density, we can differentiate y(r) and use (3.1) to get
Using y(0) = 0 and y(1) = 1, we find that
and
It follows that
from which we get (3.2). To determine m µ , we integrate (3.2) from r = 0 to r = 1 and use that m µ = 1 0 q µ (r)dr. This leads to equation (3.3) . It remains to show that (3.3) has a solution.
Let g(m) be the right hand side of (3.3). We want to show g has a fixed point. Since R is bounded, it can be shown that C −1 ≤ y ′ (r) ≤ C where
So the range of g is contained in a compact interval. Moreover, g is continuous on this interval since R is assumed to be continuous in m. By Brouwer's fixed point theorem, g has a fixed point.
Remark 3.1. Observe that the equilibrium distribution µ does not change if we add any bounded function κ(m) to the reward. In other words, any bounded compensation that is solely based on the mean performance of the population does not really incentivize the players.
Remark 3.2. When R ∈ R rm b is further independent of m (i.e. purely rank-based), the equilibrium is unique. In this case, the total effort of the population (or the expected cumulative effort of a representative player) is given by
Remark 3.3. If we confine ourselves to the subclass of equilibria which satisfy β(µ) < ∞, then all results in this section can be restated with R ∈ R rm which is obtained from R rm b by dropping the boundedness requirement.
In the next two sections, we focus on bounded rewards that are purely rank-based: R r b := {R ∈ R b : R is independent of y and m}.
Each of these rewards induces a unique equilibrium, which facilitates the study of comparative statics and optimal reward design. In this case, we write V(R) for the unique game value.
Effect of reward inequality
Definition 4.1. Given two reward functions R,R ∈ R r b , we say R is more unequal thanR in Lorenz order (or R majorizesR), written as R ≻R, if Proof. First assume R,R ∈ R r n , where R r n is the set of piecewise constant reward functions of the form
In this case, the Lorenz order translates to
which is equivalent to V(R) ≥ V(R). This finishes the proof for piecewise constant reward functions.
For general R,R ∈ R r b , we approximate V(R) and V(R) by the Riemann sums V(R (n) ) and V(R (n) ), respectively, where R (n) ,R (n) ∈ R r n . Moreover, by the mean value theorem, R (n) ,R (n) can always be chosen to satisfy
0R (r)dr for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. This ensures that the discretization preserves the Lorenz order. The result then follows from the previous step and passing to the limit.
Remark 4.1. The maximum game value is attained by the most equal reward function, namely, the uniform reward. This can also be directly seen from Jenssen's inequality:
with equality attained if and only if R is constant. From another perspective, the expected reward in equilibrium is always equal to 1 0 R(r)dr by symmetry, while the expected cost of effort is minimized to zero under the uniform reward, when nobody exerts any effort. Since uniform reward induces zero effort, the expected total effort clearly does not have the same monotonicity as the game value with respect to reward inequality (cf. Section 5.4).
Tournament design
Denote the mapping from R ∈ R r b to the unique equilibrium µ by
From (3.2), we see that E is translation invariant, i.e. E(R + C) = E(R) for any constant C. Let P + (R) be the set of probability measures on R that have strictly positive density. For µ ∈ P + (R), define the normalized density ζ µ := f µ /f 0 .
Realizing a target equilibrium distribution
Suppose the principal has in mind a target distribution µ of the terminal project value in equilibrium. He wants to know whether that is feasible via a purely rank-based reward, and if yes, how should he design the reward to achieve it? The following theorem completely characterizes the set of feasible equilibria and the reward functions that induce them.
Theorem 5.1.
(i) The set of equilibria attainable by a purely rank-based reward is given by E(R r b ) = {µ ∈ P + (R) : ζ µ , 1/ζ µ are bounded and ζ µ is increasing}.
(ii) If µ ∈ E(R r b ), then E −1 (µ) = {2cσ 2 ln ζ µ (q µ (r)) + C : C ∈ R}.
(iii) Suppose we impose additional reservation "utility" constraint V(R) ≥ V 0 and budget constraint
In particular, such a C exists if and only if
Proof. (i) From Theorem 3.1, we know that the normalized density ζ µ of any equilibrium µ is increasing and log-bounded. Conversely, given any µ ∈ P + (R) with such properties, it is easy to check that µ satisfies (3.2) with purely rank-based reward function R 0 (r) = 2cσ 2 ln ζ µ (q µ (r)):
(ii) If R(r) is another function in R r b that attains µ in equilibrium, then
2cσ 2 dz by (3.2). Differentiating both sides with respect to y and setting y = q µ (r), we obtain
Since the left hand side is independent of r, R − R 0 must be constant.
(iii) Let R(r) = R 0 (r) + C be a reward function realizing µ in equilibrium. By Theorem 3.2, the game value V(R) = V(R 0 ) + C = C. Hence V(R) ≥ V 0 if and only if C ≥ V 0 . We also have 2 ln ζ µ (q µ (r))dr = C + 2cσ 2 H µ|N (x 0 , σ 2 T ) .
Theorem 5.1 allows us to convert many optimal reward design problems into problems about finding the optimal target equilibrium distribution. We gave three solvable examples below.
Maximizing rank-α performance
Fix a number α ∈ (0, 1), a reservation utility V 0 and a budget K ≥ V 0 . We look for a reward function R ∈ R r b which meets both the reservation utility requirement and the budget constraint, and which maximizes the α-quantile of E(R). Define the set of feasible reward functions by
The optimization problem reads Q(α) := sup
Theorem 5.2. The optimal quantile Q(α) is uniquely attained (up to a.e. equivalence) by the step function
where x α is the unique solution in [α, 1) to the equation
Let µ * = E(R * ) and f 0 be given by (2.7). We have
Proof. By Theorem 5.1, µ ∈ E(H) if and only if µ ∈ E(R r b ) and
So we can equivalently formulate the optimization problem as one having µ as the decision variable, q µ (α) as the objective function, and µ ∈ E(R r b ) and (5.1) as the constraints. Maximizing q µ (α) is equivalent to maximizing
.
For any feasible equilibrium distribution µ, let h := 1/(ζ µ • q µ ) which implies ζ µ = 1/(h • F µ ), 1 0 h(r)dr = 1, and µ = E(−2cσ 2 ln h). In particular, the mapping from µ to h is one-to-one. Further rewrite the optimization problem as
where h is also constrained to be positive, decreasing, bounded and bounded away from zero, as translated from µ ∈ E(R r b ). Each feasible µ clearly induces a feasible h. Conversely, for any feasible h, define µ = E(−2cσ 2 ln h). Then −2cσ 2 ln h(r) = 2cσ 2 ln ζ µ (q µ (r)) + C for some constant C by Theorem 5.1. Together with the constraints in (5.2), we find that h = 1/(ζ µ • q µ ) and that µ is feasible. Thus, the mapping from feasible µ to feasible h is in fact bijective, which implies that it suffices for us to solve problem (5.2). Any optimal h induces an optimal µ = E(−2cσ 2 ln h) which can be realized by the reward function
Here we have added the constant V 0 to −2cσ 2 ln h to ensure that R ∈ H. The rest of the proof is devoted to solving the equivalent problem (5.2).
We first show that the constant x α given in the theorem statement is well-defined. Let
It can be shown that g(x) is strictly decreasing on (0, α) and strictly increasing on (α, 1), hence has a global minimum at x = α with g(α) = 0. Moreover, g(x) → ∞ as x → 0 or 1. Since K ≥ V 0 , by intermediate value theorem, the equation
has at least one solution. When K = V 0 , x = α is the unique solution. When K > V 0 , there are two solutions: one in (0, α) and the other in (α, 1). In both cases. x α ∈ [α, 1) is well-defined.
Next, we show that
is the unique optimizer of problem (5.2). Since 0 < α ≤ x α < 1, it is clear that h * is decreasing, bounded and bounded away from zero. Straightforward calculation also shows that
Therefore, h * satisfies all the feasibility constraints. Given any other feasible h. We have, by repeated application of Jensen's inequality, that
We claim that J (h) ≤ x α = J (h * ). Suppose on the contrary that J (h) > x α . Then since x α ≥ α and g is strictly increasing on (α, 1), we must have g(J (h)) > g(x α ), which is a contradiction. Thus, we have proved that h * is optimal. In fact, h * is the unique optimizer, since J (h) = J (h * ) would imply all Jensen's inequalities above are equalities. This holds if and only if h is constant on [0, α) and (α, 1]. We then use J (h) = J (h * ) = x α and 1 0 h(r)dr = 1 to deduce that h = h * . Finally, we argue that the optimal reward function R * = V 0 − 2cσ 2 ln h * induced by h * is also unique. Because of the bijection between µ and h, we know that µ * = E(−2cσ 2 ln h * ) is the unique optimal equilibrium distribution. Note that H µ * |N (x 0 , σ 2 T ) =
The remaining theorem statements follow from direct calculation.
Remark 5.1. One can also replace the reservation utility constraint by the hard constraint: R ≥ R 0 . Similar to [1, Theorem 6.2] , the optimal reward function in this case is the equal reward with cutoff rank α, i.e. R(r) = R 0 +
Maximizing net profit
Suppose each terminal output y generates a profit g(y) for the principal, where g is a bounded increasing function. The goal is to find R ∈ R r b such that V(R) ≥ V 0 and the net profit
is maximized.
Theorem 5.3. The optimal net profit is given by
, and is uniquely attained by
where f 0 is given by (2.7), and
Proof. By Theorem 5.1, it suffices for us to look for the optimal µ ∈ E(R r b ) which can then be realized by R(r) = 2cσ 2 ln ζ µ (q µ (r)) + C for any C ≥ V 0 . It is clear that the principal should pick C = V 0 to minimize the cost. Write R µ (r) = 2cσ 2 ln ζ µ (q µ (r)) + V 0 . We then have
The optimization problem over µ is given by
is bounded and increasing.
To solve problem (5.3), we define
For each fixed λ ∈ R, the integrand above attains its pointwise maximum at
Clearly, since g is bounded and increasing, so is ln(f µ /f 0 ). We then find λ by
The formulas for f µ * and R * = R µ * then follow.
Maximizing total effort
Let K ≥ V 0 be given. We look for a purely rank-based reward function R which maximizes the total effort
subject to the reservation utility constraint V(R) ≥ V 0 and the budget constraint
Proof. By Theorem 5.1, it suffices for us to look for an optimal target distribution µ satisfying
Such a µ, if lies in E(R r b ), can be realized by the reward function R(r) = 2cσ 2 ln ζ µ (q µ (r)) + V 0 . We shall assume that we are in the nontrivial case K > V 0 , otherwise the only attainable equilibrium is µ = N (x 0 , σ 2 T ) which is induced by the uniform reward. We first relax the boundedness requirement of ln(f µ /f 0 ); it turns out that the the relaxed optimizer fails to be in E(R r b ). We then construct an approximate optimizer by truncation.
The relaxed optimization problem over µ reads
Any candidate optimizer f µ * necessarily satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (see e.g. [19] )
The above implies
where λ 2 > 0 is determined by the complementary slackness
In other words, µ * = N (x 0 + (K − V 0 )T /c, σ 2 T ). It is also clear that ln f µ * (y)/f 0 (y) is increasing.
Since the objective and the equality constraints are linear in f µ , and the inequality constraint is convex in f µ , it can also be shown that these conditions, together with the monotonicity of ln f µ * /f 0 , are sufficient for optimality. The relaxed optimal value equals (
Since ln f µ * /f 0 is unbounded, such a µ * / ∈ R r b . Consider the truncated µ M defined in the theorem statement. We have R M ∈ R r b and µ M = E(R M ) for all M . Moreover, let
We can show that
as M → ∞. It follows that
Remark 5.2. It can be verified using Theorem 3.1 that
is an equilibrium induced by the unbounded reward
The optimal effort process associated with µ * is constant:
cT , by straightforward calculation using (2.9). This can also be seen by directly substituting
into the control problem, yielding a linear-quadratic optimization:
However, it is not clear whether µ * is the unique equilibrium under R * .
Price of anarchy
For a fixed reward function R, the price of anarchy (PoA) is defined as the ratio between the optimal centralized welfare V c and the worst equilibrium welfare/game value. By centralized, we mean that the principal can prescribe and enforce the effort, or equivalently, the law of the controlled process, for the agents. We only consider a symmetric effort prescription, i.e. same terminal law for all players. To avoid triviality, we consider R that is not purely rank-based, otherwise the optimal centralized welfare is always equal to 1 0 R(r)dr which is attained by prescribing zero effort for all.
The optimal centralized welfare V c is defined as
This is a control problem of McKean-Vlasov type. Similar to the derivation of (2.6), we can reformulate the centralized problem as
When R(x, r, m) is independent of individual performance x, the inner optimization over µ is explicitly solvable. Specifically, letting Π(m) := 1 0 R(r, m)dr, we have
Here and in the sequel, we omit the underlying assumption that m ∈ R and µ ∈ P(R). Using the Lagrange method, we find that the mean-constrained entropy minimization has optimal value
, attained by the normal distribution µ * = N (m, σ 2 T ). It follows that
We see that V c < ∞ if Π(m) has sub-quadratic growth. As one would expect for a symmetric game, the centralized solution does not depend on the rank-order allocation of rewards.
When R(x, r, m) is independent of rank r, we have A Schrödinger bridges from space to time
Let Ω = C([0, T ], R) be the canonical space and W x be the Wiener measure starting at x at time zero. Also let (F t ) t∈[0,T ] be the filtration generated by the canonical process. Define τ (ω) := inf{t ∈ [0, T ] : w t = 0} with the convention that inf ∅ = ∞. Given a reference measure P ∈ P(Ω), a source distribution ν ∈ P(R) and a target distribution µ ∈ P(T) where T := [0, T ] ∪ {∞}, consider the following variant of the Schrödinger bridge problem: inf Q∈P(Ω) H(Q|P ) subject to Q 0 = ν, Q • τ −1 = µ.
For any Q ∈ P(Ω), define Q x,t := Q(·|ω 0 = x, τ (ω) = t). We have the disintegration:
Similar to the standard Schrödinger bridge problem, one can show that the optimal transport plan is given by
where π * is the solution to Here it is assumed that Rμ(t) = R ∞ ∈ R for all t > T . Take X = x 0 + σω t and P = W 0 • X −1 , and identify a t with the set of laws Q := Q ∈ P(Ω) : Q ∼ P, dQ dP = dQ dP F τ ∧T .
The condition on the Radon-Nikodym derivation means a t ≡ 0 for all t > τ ∧ T . Let µ 0 := P • τ −1 be the law of the first passage time of level x 0 /σ of a Brownian motion. We can rewrite the agent's control problem in weak formulation aŝ Note that for each µ ∼ µ 0 , the associated optimal Q = Q µ = T P x 0 ,t (·)µ(dt) is always equivalent to P and satisfies dQ/dP = ζ(τ ) ∈ F τ ∧T , where ζ(t) := dµ(t)/dµ 0 (t). It follows that Q ∈ Q and the inequality is in fact an equality. The resulting static problem can be further split into a constrained calculus of variation problem, followed by a static optimization: 
